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The Macroeconomic Court: Rhetoric and
Implications of New Deal Decision-Making
Nancy Staudt* & Yilei He**
¶1

¶2

Upon striking down substantial portions of New Deal legislation, the Supreme
Court, in 1937, reversed its thinking and sided with the government in a series of cases
challenging regulation intended to bring about national economic recovery during the
Great Depression. Not only did the Court begin upholding the laws adopted by Congress
and the President, it also announced a significant—some say revolutionary—new
understanding of judicial review1: it would henceforth presume the constitutionality of all
economically-oriented statutes. This new view, formally pronounced in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,2 is particularly noteworthy because the Court had long devoted
substantial time and energy to the task of defining the boundaries of congressional
authority to regulate commercial transactions. The holding and language of Carolene
Products, along with several other contemporaneous cases,3 however, virtually unleashed
Congress and the President to regulate, and the Court all but guaranteed it would sanction
economic policies and programs no matter how “preposterous” they might seem.4
Why the Court so drastically shifted its views—moving from an assumption that all
economic regulation was unconstitutional, or at least suspect, to one that presumed
*

Class of 1940 Research Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
Juris Doctor Candidate, 2011, Northwestern University School of Law.
1
For the previous three decades, the Court had invalidated a broad range of economic legislation on the
ground that it interfered with the freedom of contract. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). As noted by Justice Stone, irrespective of
the stated motivation for adopting a law regulating commercial transactions, courts would henceforth
assume legislators had legitimately exercised their constitutional authority:
There is no need to consider [legislative statements] here as more than a declaration of the
legislative findings deemed to support and justify the action taken as a constitutional exertion of
the legislative power, aiding informed judicial review, as do the reports of legislative
committees, by revealing the rationale of the legislation. Even in the absence of such aids, the
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless, in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators. The present statutory findings affect appellee no more than the
reports of the Congressional committees, and since, in the absence of the statutory findings, they
would be presumed, their incorporation in the statute is no more prejudicial than surplusage.
Id. at 152–53.
3
See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage law for
women); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935); Steward Machine Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
(upholding the Social Security Act of 1935).
4
A student note suggests that preposterous laws might be struck. See Note, State Views on Economic Due
Process: 1937–1953, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 830 (1953) (“Under the protection of such a presumption
only the most preposterous of statutes can fall.”). For a law the Court upheld that is widely viewed as
absurd, see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding Oklahoma law forbidding optician
from fitting or duplicating lenses without prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist).
**
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constitutionality—is, of course, a topic of widespread debate and controversy in the
extant literature. The most widely accepted account argues that political factors,
especially President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plans, best explain the doctrinal
transformation that took place in the late 1930s.5 A competing view of this juridical shift
argues that the legal developments observed at that time began to materialize decades
earlier, and thus the views set forth in Carolene Products (and the various other judicial
opinions sanctioning economic regulation) simply mark the culmination of a natural,
almost inevitable, progression of constitutional ideas.6
One of the most intriguing—and convincing—explanations in our view, and one
that scholars and commentators have largely ignored, derives from the Court itself. As
various Justices have noted, the declining state of the economy seriously challenged the
logic of the early Court’s anti-regulation policies and doctrines, and this reality may have
transformed the judicial calculus vis-à-vis the New Deal and economic legislation more
generally. In a recent case, the Justices commented on the doctrinal shift that occurred
decades earlier:
[T]he Depression had come and, with it, the lesson that seemed
unmistakable to most people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual
freedom . . . rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about the
capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of
human welfare. As Justice Jackson wrote of the constitutional crisis of
1937 shortly before he came on the bench: “The older world of laissezfaire was recognized everywhere outside the Court to be dead.” . . . [T]he
clear demonstration that the facts of economic life were different from
those previously assumed warranted the repudiation of the old law.7

¶4

Put differently, while political threats existed and legal developments took place, a desire
to promote economic renewal in the face of the worst economic downturn in the
country’s history is also likely to have played an important, if not dominant, role in the
Court’s shift in the late 1930s with respect to economic legislation challenged in federal
court.
The implications of this judicial change of heart seem clear: the Court would no
longer attempt to shape the nation’s economic policy. In fact, the Court has stated as
much:
5
Legal and historical scholars, including Laura Kalman, Edwin Corwin, and Robert McCloskey, for
example, note that the Court systematically struck down New Deal legislation in 1935 and 1936. In 1936,
however, FDR was enthusiastically reelected, indicating widespread and popular support for his efforts to
aid the nation’s ailing economy. Angered by the Court’s interference and committed to the New Deal
programs, FDR proposed a Court-packing plan in 1937 calling for fundamental (and to many, unwanted)
changes to the Court’s make-up in order to assure a supportive panel of justices for future cases and
controversies. To avoid this threat, the Court, it is argued, abruptly changed its judicial views to support
FDR and his economic efforts. EDWARD CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 12, 64 (1941);
Laura Kalman, The Constitution, The Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052, 1052–
53 (2005); Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV 34, 34–35 (1962).
6
For an excellent summary of these two views, see Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108
YALE L. J. 2165 (1999) (exploring the dispute between internalists, who attribute the constitutional change
during the New Deal to doctrinal or intellectual causes, and externalists, who emphasize political reasons).
7
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–62 (1992) (citations omitted).

88

Vol. 5:1]

Nancy Staudt & Yilei He

[T]he day is gone when this Court . . . [strikes down] laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. . . .
“For protection against abuses by legislatures, the people must resort to
the polls, not the courts.”8

¶5

¶6

¶7

Rather than promoting their own economic theories and their own views on how best to
promote a stable and prosperous economy via the judicial decision-making process, the
Court in the late 1930s reached the conclusion that deference to the elected branches was
the better way to go. The Court had come to believe that judicial oversight of the
nation’s business and commercial strategies was not likely to advance the country’s
interests and could impose unintended harm. This is the very point made by the Court in
the language quoted above.
In this Article, we seek to contribute to the scholarly understanding of why the
Court altered its constitutional course in the late 1930s and, at the same time, highlight
the unexplored implications of that choice. With respect to our first goal, we argue
(along with the Court itself) that the state of the economy is an important explanatory
factor for understanding judicial behavior in the 1930s (as well as both prior to and after
that time). We do not mean to suggest that economic factors solely explain judicial
behavior, but we hope to highlight an important variable that scholars have largely
ignored. With respect to our second aim, we argue that while the Court chose to presume
the constitutionality of economic legislation, this choice did not signal an abandonment
of judicial oversight of the economic policymaking emanating from the elected branches
of government as is widely believed; as we explain below, oversight continues, but it now
takes a different form.
To make our points, we note that the Court’s decisions throughout the first several
decades of the twentieth century are filled with rhetoric, commentary, and dicta evincing
considerable interest in the national economy, macroeconomic trends, and the economic
effects of lawmaking more generally. Indeed, irrespective of individual judicial views on
economic theory (that is, the preference for a free market or regulatory approach to
policymaking), it is apparent that all hoped to advance economic prosperity; divisions
across the Court laid with how best to achieve that goal, not with the propriety of the goal
itself. While the rhetoric and dicta largely disappeared from the Court’s opinions
beginning in the late 1930s with the Carolene Products decision, we believe it is highly
improbable that the Court, from that time forward, chose to completely ignore economic
conditions in their decision-making process. A more likely scenario is the one suggested
by the legal and political scholars Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein, and Nancy Staudt: the
judicial strategy for promoting economic prosperity shifted, but not the underlying goal.9
To be sure, the Court in the late 1930s chose (perhaps rationally) to assume that all
economic legislation would pass constitutional muster, but this choice should not be
interpreted as an indication that the Justices would no longer be concerned with the
nation’s economy or that they had completely abdicated all responsibility for economic
policymaking to the elected branches of government. Prior to 1937–1938, the Court
devoted considerable time and energy to economic issues and continually expressed
8
9

Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)).
See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
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concern for viable market conditions.10 While interfering with President Roosevelt’s
New Deal legislation on the grounds that an unregulated economy was the best means to
promote economic prosperity was a colossal error in judgment given the depressionary
conditions that existed,11 and the Court has in fact supported economic legislation since
that time, these events should not be viewed as a transformation of judicial preferences in
terms of the economy. In fact, we argue that the choice in the late 1930s to presume the
constitutionality of any and all commercial regulation was a judicial strategy to improve
the nation’s chances for economic growth and prosperity—a strategy that encompassed
leaving substantive policymaking to the experts.
Deference on the constitutional dimension, however, is not the only means by
which the Court can advance its economic preference for a growing and stable economy.
As Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt have noted, the Court can assume a statute passes
constitutional muster but this conclusion does not terminate the opportunity for judicial
oversight.12 The Court continues to be in a position to interpret the language and breadth
of the law and thus its applicability to the particular cases and controversies that show up
on its docket. This interpretive power enables the Court to promote or undermine the
government’s policymaking strategy, notwithstanding the presumption of
constitutionality. To see this, consider the fact that a pro-government decision in the
labor, taxation, or antitrust context advances existing policies while one that goes against
the government weakens the regulatory objectives. In short, it is possible that while the
Court relinquished its role in substantive economic policymaking in the late 1930s, they
continued to have precisely the same economic goals and aims that they have had
throughout history—a preference for growth and prosperity. And more importantly, for
our purposes, they are able to continue promoting this interest with a two-pronged
approach: 1) assume all economic laws and regulations are constitutional, but 2) interpret
10

The Court’s language in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, for example, evidenced its deep
concern over the devastating effects of the Great Depression. There the Court considered the
constitutionality of an extension of the foreclosure redemption period under a Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Law. The Court upheld the statute on the grounds that the legislation was enacted to address
an emergency economic crisis, a legitimate end; furthermore the Court opined that the extension was a
reasonable exercise of state’s policy power. Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, detailed the devastating
economy in length:
The present nationwide and worldwide business and financial crisis has the same results as if it
were caused by flood, earthquake, or disturbance in nature. It has deprived millions of persons
in this nation of their employment and means of earning a living for themselves and their
families; it has destroyed the value of and the income from all property on which thousands of
people depended for a living; it actually has resulted in the loss of their homes by a number of
our people and threatens to result in the loss of their homes by many other people, in this state; it
has resulted in such widespread want and suffering among our people that private, state, and
municipal agencies are unable to adequately relieve the want and suffering, and congress has
found it necessary to step in and attempt to remedy the situation by federal aid. Millions of the
people's money were and are yet tied up in closed banks and in business enterprises.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 420–21 (1934).
11
In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, Justice Brandeis, agreeing with the government that “[t]o stay
experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility[,]” worried that “[d]enial of the
right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation . . . .” 285 U.S. 262, 310
(1932).
12
See Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial Outcomes: A MacroTheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L. REV. 1191, 1197 (2009) [hereinafter Brennan et al., Macro-Theory]
(predicting that justices’ voting behaviors will continue to comport with their interests in economic
prosperity).
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the law in a manner that strengthens or weakens extant policies depending on their ability
to advance judicial economic goals and aims. As we note below, the Court looks to the
state of the economy for purposes of deciding how it should pursue the second prong of
this strategy.
¶9
This Article is organized as follows: Part I outlines Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s
theory for why we should expect economic conditions to enter the judicial utility
function, thereby affecting individual votes and case outcomes. Part II investigates a
small collection of cases decided during the first three decades of the twentieth century,
often called the Lochner-era due to the Court’s systematic attempt to shape the nation’s
economic policy in a manner consistent with a laissez-faire theory of economics
embodied in the Lochner case. Part III examines a collection of cases decided in the
early and mid-1930s—the time when the Court began to shift back-and-forth in its views
vis-à-vis economic regulation, ultimately reaching the decision to dispose of its laissezfaire theory altogether in 1937–1938. In this last part, we demonstrate that the judicial
rhetoric and dicta throughout both periods consistently reflect a judicial concern for the
nation’s economy as hypothesized by the theory set forth in Part I. Moreover, we show
how the observed changes in judicial outcomes leading up to the constitutional revolution
in the 1930s, and so widely discussed and analyzed in the literature, fit within Brennan,
Epstein, and Staudt’s theory of judicial decision-making, offering surprisingly strong
evidence for the plausibility of the theory.
¶10
This Article sets the stage for a subsequent and more in-depth scholarly challenge
to the conventional wisdom that the federal judiciary has adopted a passive—perhaps
even unthinking—role with regard to economic matters since the time of the Great
Depression. It also challenges the widely held view that the constitutional revolution that
took place in the 1930s can best be explained by politics and doctrinal developments, but
not the economy itself. To be sure, substantial doctrinal transformations took place and
politics were at play, but the judicial rhetoric and commentary that emerged at the time
also highlight the notion that the Court was pursuing the best means to promote their
economic goals which, given the persistent crisis-level conditions that then plagued the
nation, called for dramatic changes in judicial review and oversight.
I. THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS CYCLE: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
¶11

The judicial business cycle is grounded in a straightforward claim about the men
and women appointed to the High Court: Justices prefer national prosperity to an
economy plagued by high unemployment, high inflation, and low productivity.13 It is
possible that this preference emerges from the Court’s role in the development of law and
legal policy, or perhaps it comes about from the Justices’ status as individuals who care
13

This Part summarizes the positions adopted in Brennan et al., Macro-Theory, supra note 12 (presenting
an empirical study to support the argument that the state of macro-economy affects the Court’s decisionmaking), and Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, The Political Economy of Judging, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1503 (2009) [hereinafter Brennan et al., Political Economy] (suggesting that macroeconomic state
correlates with the Justices’ decision on whether to cooperate with the other branches of government in
recessionary times to promote national economic development). Also, for a detailed discussion of the
Court’s decision-making behavior in times of crisis, see generally NANCY STAUDT, THE JUDICIAL POWER
OF THE PURSE: HOW COURTS FUND NATIONAL DEFENSE IN TIMES OF CRISIS (under contract with University
of Chicago Press) [hereinafter STAUDT, JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE].
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very much about their own private investments and purchasing power. It is not necessary
to explain why the Court prefers national economic success to failure, rather the point is
this: the Justices gain utility from certain economic conditions and suffer disutility from
others.
The theory does not stop with the simple claim that the Court prefers an expanding
to a contracting economy, rather the theory posits that the Justices are instrumentally
rational actors and thus will seek to advance their economic preferences through their
Article III decision-making power. More specifically, members of the Court will seek to
promote federal policies that encourage economic growth and development, but will
attempt to deter policymaking perceived to steer the nation into economic stagnation, or
worse, the serious economic decline associated with a depression.
The Court, of course, is not in a position to craft economic policy: the Framers of
the Constitution formally placed economic policymaking power into the hands of the
elected branches of government. Article I, section 8, for example, grants legislators the
authority to “provide for the general welfare of the United States” and to “regulate
commerce,”14 and Article II, section 3 mandates the president “shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.”15 Just as federal courts have no foreign policymaking
powers but are theoretically able to influence military strategizing via Article III
decision-making power,16 so too can we expect the Court to facilitate and impede the
elected branches’ economic policy choices through judicial decision-making authority,
thereby affecting the substance of these policies—at least at the margin.
To understand how and why the Court is in a position to influence economic
policy, it is useful to recall that Congress and the President continually exercise their
constitutional economic powers through a range of programs implemented in legal
contexts such as taxation, bankruptcy, antitrust, securities regulation, transportation
regulation, and so forth. Indeed, government action in the economic field is so
widespread that it touches virtually every aspect of our daily lives in some form or
another. Private parties, in turn, routinely challenge these policies in federal court, and it
is through this line of cases and controversies that the Court is able to affect domestic
economic issues. By systematically issuing votes and outcomes in favor of the
government’s position, the Court effectively supports the elected branches’ policy
preferences, while disfavoring the government in these disputes undermines the
government’s economic aims and goals.
The theory is grounded in the idea that economic prosperity is more likely when
policymaking rests in the hands of competent officials, and for this reason the Justices
maximize their own utility by promoting the work of skilled decision-makers and
deterring ineptitude when it emerges. At first cut, the idea that Supreme Court Justices—
experts in law and constitutional matters—seek to distinguish economic competence from
incompetence in the elected branches of government might seem peculiar and more than
a bit unrealistic. After all, trained economists are often unable to agree upon or
determine, as an empirical matter, the policies and programs that advance the nation’s
14

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
16
See generally NANCY STAUDT, JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE, supra note 13 (noting formal and
constitutional limits on the federal courts’ foreign policymaking powers, but highlighting judges’ ability to
shape foreign policy nonetheless).
15
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economic interests, and thus a theory of judicial behavior that rests on the assumption
that the Justices are able to do so is entirely implausible. The Court need not rely on its
own (limited) expertise, however, to advance its goals and aims in terms of economic
policymaking. The Justices, being rational, will rely on credible cues and signals to
determine how and when to use their decision-making powers to advance their preference
for economic prosperity.
¶16
We expect the Court will interpret an expanding economy as a cue that the
legislative and executive branches are doing a good job—or at least have not imposed
unnecessary harm on the economy—and thus should be supported. Judicial interpretation
of the cues associated with economic downturns, however, will be slightly more nuanced.
Rather than assuming that the Court will treat each and every contraction equivalently,
the theory posits that minimally informed Justices will understand that economic
downturns are likely to be associated not only with the choices made by the nation’s
leaders, but also with unrelated and unexpected shocks to the economy such as wars, oil
price fluctuations, trade barriers imposed by foreign governments, harvest failures, and so
forth.17 This is a distinction with meaning: When the Court views the downturn as a
product of substandard government policy choices—not of uncontrollable and exogenous
shocks—they will punish the elected branches in courtroom proceedings as a means to
deter incompetent policymaking. But, should the Court believe that negative economic
conditions are the result of factors largely beyond the control of the government, they
will not sanction federal policymakers, they will seek to work as a team with the other
branches of government in order to remedy the nation’s economic problems.
¶17
Of course, in the context of economic planning, even experts cannot hope to
distinguish precisely between different types of economic downturns—those caused by
policymaking failures and those that emerge from outside forces—and the Court certainly
does not have a have higher level of economic proficiency than trained professionals.
Economists Andrew Abel, Ben Bernanke, and Dean Croushore note that national
economic conditions often materialize due to a complex amalgamation of factors both
inside and outside the government’s control, making it extremely difficult for anyone to
distinguish useful federal policies from those that impose harm across the nation.18
Importantly, the theory does not hypothesize that the Court has skill and expertise with
respect to the macroeconomy, but rather that it is possible that the Justices are able to
distinguish economic downturns and recessions that are typical and recurrent from
conditions associated with widespread poverty and hardship that are atypical and rare,
such as those observed in the 1930s and described as a depression.19 When it comes to
17

ANDREW ABEL, BEN BERNANKE & DEAN CROUSHORE, MACROECONOMICS 282–306 (2008); see
generally RAYMOND M. DUCH & RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON, THE ECONOMIC VOTE: HOW POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS CONDITION ELECTION RESULTS (2008) (discussing a range of factors that can
affect the state of the economy and identifying the role of economy conditions on voting behavior).
18
ABEL, BERNANKE & CROUSHORE, supra note 17, at 282–306.
19
As is widely understood, the U.S. economy has grown tremendously over the course of the last century,
but as the macroeconomists widely note, even prosperous economies are periodically interrupted by
episodes of declining production and income, and rising unemployment. Id. at 282–306. Sometimes these
episodes are prolonged, severe, and harsh, and the downturn becomes a “depression,” but the downturns
can also be relatively short and considerably less brutal, in which case the periods in which aggregate
economic activity falls is a “contraction” or a “recession.” Irrespective of the nature and extent of the
downturn, macroeconomists note they are almost invariably followed by a resumption of economic growth.
In the words of Abel, et al.:
This repeated sequence of economic expansion giving way to temporary decline followed by
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the typical upswings and downswings that routinely take place in the economy, the Court
will assign blame (or credit) to Congress and the President out of a belief (right or wrong)
that the economic peaks and troughs lie within the policymakers’ control. In atypical
catastrophic periods, the Court will view economic conditions as primarily attributable to
a series of unexplained and exogenous shocks beyond the control of the government and
so will not seek to hold policymakers accountable. When a catastrophe occurs that is not
attributed to government action, the Court will join with the government, via decisions
supporting the government’s position, to fend off the crisis in an effort to return the
nation to a state of prosperity.
¶18
That the economic downturns associated with the typical business cycle—the
repeated sequence of recessions that give way to periods of prosperity, which are then
followed again by recessions—serve as a judicial proxy for government policymaking
failure is no mystery. Researchers such as Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, among
others, have noted that elected officials, specifically the President and members of
Congress, are often willing to ignore, tolerate, or even risk short-term national economic
losses in off-election years for political gain.20 When an election becomes imminent,
however, politicians have an incentive to appear competent and perform well to assure
reelection. At the same time, the literature suggests that elected officials will work hard
to fend off protracted periods of (costly) economic distortion given that such conditions
not only cause widespread and serious damage to citizens across the nation, but also
long-term harm to the political reputations of incumbents. In fact, the idea that economic
crises induce different types of policymaking choices than those observed during the
typical business cycle is the “new orthodoxy.”21 Researchers have proposed a number of
theories to explain why crisis related policies are unique, including the weakened nature
of ideological interests,22 the short-term suspension of self-interested behavior,23 and
increased levels of teamwork in times of emergency.24 For our purposes, the underlying
theory of why elected officials respond differently under different economic conditions is
less relevant than the twin ideas posited above: elected officials have an incentive to shirk
responsibility in the short-term but work for the benefit of the nation in the long-term to
avoid crises. If it is true they are willing to risk a series of minor recessions but not vast
and widespread depressionary conditions, then it is perfectly reasonable for the Court to
believe that the economic downturns that take place during the typical business cycle are
the products of inept policies, while economic crises (i.e., precisely the economic
conditions elected officials seek to avoid) are beyond the officials’ control.
recovery, is known as the business cycle. The business cycle is a central concern in macroeconomics
because business cycle fluctuations—the ups and downs in overall economic activity—are felt
throughout the economy. When the economy is growing strongly, prosperity is shared by most of the
industries and their workers and owners of capital. When the economy weakens, many sectors of the
economy experience declining sales and production, and workers are laid off or forced to work only
part-time.
Id. at 282.
20
TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, POLITICAL ECONOMICS: EXPLAINING ECONOMIC POLICY 69–92
(2000); see also Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cyles, 55 REV.
ECON. STUD. 1, 1–16 (1988).
21
ALLAN DRAZEN, POLITICAL ECONOMY IN MACROECONOMICS 444 (2000).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
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Figure 1 provides historical data on the state of the nation’s economy; the figure
presents a lowess smoother of the business cycle, where periods of economic decline are
coded as equal to -1, and periods of economic expansion are code as equal to +1. As
indicated in the figure, the economy suffered a major setback in the early 1930s, followed
by a short period of recovery from 1934–1936, and then a second major setback in the
late 1930s. Although the conventional wisdom suggests that the entire decade of the
1930s exhibited one prolonged period of economic contraction, in fact, there appear to be
two distinct periods of depression—as indicated in the figure—which is an important
point for our discussion below.25 Finally, while both before and after the 1930s the
economy cycled through various expansions and contractions, they were relatively
modest when compared to those observed in the 1930s.

Figure 1: U.S. economy cycles through contractions and expansions
Note: Lowess smoother of business cycles; economic expansions coded as equal to +1 and economic
contractions coded as equal to -1. Depressions occurred only in the 1930s; all other economic downturns can be
labeled recessions.

¶20

That the Court has information and knowledge of the general state of the economy
and is willing to consider it in the decision-making process is well documented below.
As we will see, judicial opinions, litigants’ briefs, and clerks’ memoranda are filled with
rhetoric and commentary with regard to the economy, suggesting courtroom actors are
continually apprised of the nation’s economic conditions and believe they are relevant to
the Justices’ votes and to case outcomes. Whether the Court takes judicial notice of
increasing and decreasing levels of economic prosperity and growth is one question of
interest, but the more difficult and important question to answer is whether the Court
accounts for these cyclical changes in their decision-making process. This Article
presents numerous examples of cases in which the Justices take judicial notice of the
economy and sets the stage for further investigation of how this notice affects outcomes.
¶21
If the judicial business cycle theory of decision-making accurately captures the
Court's interest in promoting proficient policymaking, then its empirical implications are

25

ABEL, BERNANKE & CROUSHORE, supra note 17, at 282–306.
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clear.26 Most obviously, the Court can be expected to reward the elected branches of
government for periods of prosperity by adopting a pro-government position in litigation
involving economic policy. Put another way: The government’s win-rate should
positively correlate with various economic indicators, such as employment rates,
industrial production levels, GDP, and so forth. Conversely, when the economy turns
sour and the Court holds elected actors responsible out of a belief that they have
privileged their short-term electoral interests over national economic interests—that is,
during recessionary periods—the Court can be expected to punish the bad policy choices
by ruling against the government. If the Court believes, however, that Congress and the
President could not have prevented the downturn, because the crisis worked against their
electoral prospects—that is, became a deep depression—the Court is unlikely to hold
them responsible or even to second-guess their policymaking choices. In fact, the theory
suggests that the Court will support the national government in its attempt to stabilize the
economy during severe economic downturns by deferring to its arguments in the
economic cases that appear on the docket.
¶22
The empirical implications of the theory have been subject to preliminary
investigation by Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt. The authors, both together and separately,
have found substantial evidence supporting the theory, thereby suggesting that a judicial
“business cycle” is at play in the decision-making process, as posited above.27 The
authors investigated the issues in a large-N study with the help of statistical methods, but
did not explore individual cases or judicial rhetoric in any depth. The point of the
analysis below, then, is to find answers to two questions: 1) is the Court aware of the
state of the economy?; and 2) does their rhetoric and dicta suggest that they account for
extant economic conditions in the decision-making process? The answer to both queries
is unambiguously yes.
II. LAISSEZ-FAIRE ECONOMICS AND THE RHETORIC OF THE LOCHNER-ERA
¶23

We begin the qualitative discussion of Supreme Court cases with a focus on
Lochner v. New York,28 a controversy decided in 1905 and widely viewed as the
beginning of the Court’s attempt to formally—and systematically—embed laissez-faire
economics into constitutional doctrine.29 Lochner is an important decision in part
because the majority opinion sets forth its view on the dangers inherent in government
26

Note that we recognize that elected officials have an incentive to shirk responsibility in the short term but
work for the benefit of the nation in the long term to avoid crises, which are the twin ideas posited above.
In such sense, the Court is expected to believe that the economic downturns that take place during the
typical business cycle are the products of inept policies, while economic crises (i.e., precisely the economic
conditions elected officials seek to avoid) are beyond the officials’ control.
27
Brennan et al., Macro-Theory, supra note 13, at 1195–97.
28
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
29
Lochner has generated substantial attention over the course of the last century—and most of it is critical.
In the words of the legal scholar David Strauss, Lochner “would probably win the prize, if there were one,
for the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred years.” David Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003). The legal and political scholar Bernard Schwartz argues that “[a]side
from Dred Scott itself, Lochner . . . is now considered the most discredited decision in Supreme Court
history.” BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 190 (1993). The important point for
our purposes is not to be yet more critical of the decision, but to note that in advocating an interpretation of
the Constitution that advanced a preferred theory of economics, the Justices sought to promote the nation’s
financial and commercial interests.
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regulation.30 Yet, as the legal historian David Strauss has noted, it is more than a case,
“[i]t symbolizes the era in which the Supreme Court invalidated nearly two hundred
social welfare and regulatory measures, including minimum wage laws, laws designed to
enable employees to unionize, and a federal statute establishing a pension system for
railway workers” on the theory that any government interference with individual
economic rights and liberties was suspect.31
¶24
The idea of economic liberty and freedom underlying the laissez-faire approach to
constitutional doctrine has been subject to widespread criticism, but it is also grounded in
widely accepted economic and political principles. To begin, the right to engage freely in
contractual relations and commercial activity is undeniably valuable and worthy of some
protection. As Strauss and many others have pointed out, when parties bargain and
negotiate, it is reasonable to assume the agreements that emerge reflect choices that
advance the interests of both sides.32 Government interference with this freedom, then, is
likely to reduce well-being by impeding access to the very goods each party seeks to
obtain. Moreover, restrictions on economic freedom can legitimately be viewed as
inconsistent with individual autonomy: they deny people the right to control important
aspects of their lives in the manner they see fit.33 The problem, of course, is that
economic liberalism and unrestrained business activity also have drawbacks. Markets
can be anticompetitive, biased, and abusive, leading many to argue that regulation is
necessary to curb problems associated with commercial monopolies, child labor, unsafe
working conditions, and so forth. Indeed, even scholars and commentators suspicious of
government regulation have appreciation for its importance to individual and national
success. As the economist Robert Higgs notes, “Without government to defend us from
external aggression, preserve domestic order, define and enforce private property rights,
few of us could achieve much.”34 To be sure, the appropriate nature and optimal level of
government action is widely debated, but few question the notion that national
policymakers must protect our property and assure our safety and security from both
internal and external threats.
¶25
These two views of economic theory—government regulation versus economic
liberty—and the underlying goal of both (to promote wealth and prosperity) repeatedly
emerge in judicial opinions in the early part of the twentieth century. Justices on both
sides of the debate interpreted the Constitution in a manner that advanced their own
theory of the economy, but all sought to enhance the nation’s economic welfare.
Importantly, however, the judicial debate with respect to economic theory and its role in
constitutional interpretation did not end with these two perspectives. Indeed, it was the
third view, advanced primarily by Justice Holmes, which eventually won the day.35
Holmes argued that the Court should not infuse the Constitution with either theory of
economics, but instead should allow the experts in the elected branches of government to

30

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54–65.
Strauss, supra note 29, at 373.
32
Id. at 383.
33
Id.
34
ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 3 (1987).
35
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
31
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pursue rational policymaking choices in a variety of ways and without judicial
interference—irrespective of the Court’s own beliefs.36
¶26
As we will see, Lochner’s majority along with its two dissenting opinions together
reflect these three divergent outlooks. The valuable point for our purposes is that each
view encompassed ideas that would allegedly promote the nation’s financial and
commercial interests, and, for this reason, all had similar underlying goals and aims. The
Lochner majority, in short, may have attached itself to a flawed theory (although this is
debated) and may have sought to shape the nation’s economic policies without the
requisite knowledge and expertise (this is not debated),37 but its underlying intentions
were sound, and it is more than likely that the Court remains committed to advancing
economic prosperity.
¶27
The Lochner case, one of the most infamous in the Court’s history, involved the
following facts: Joseph Lochner was convicted of violating a New York law that clearly
limited bakery employees to working no more than sixty hours a week or ten hours a day
when he allowed, or required, his workers to exceed this limit.38 Lochner appealed his
conviction up the judicial hierarchy, eventually reaching the U.S. Supreme Court.39
Justice Peckham, speaking for the majority, overturned the conviction, holding that New
York’s bakery laws violated both Lochner’s and the employee’s right to contract, a right
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.40 While noting that the states have legitimate
police powers, the Court’s opinion is devoted to identifying the inherent dangers of those
powers.41 Sanctioning the regulations governing bakers, the Court suggested, would set
precedent for allowing the government to interfere with virtually every aspect of our
daily lives and in every trade, which in turn would undermine individual liberty and
impede the contracts that an individual deems “appropriate or necessary for the support
of himself and his family.”42 Freedom of contract, in short, was essential for survival,
and the argument that long hours harmed employees was not sufficient to interfere with
this fundamental right to support themselves. In Justice Peckham’s words:
It is unfortunately true that labor, even in any department, may possibly
carry with it the seeds of unhealthiness. But are we all, on that account, at
the mercy of legislative majorities? A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a
carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a dry goods clerk, a bank's, a lawyer’s, or a
physician's clerk, or a clerk in almost any kind of business, would all come
under the power of the legislature, on this assumption. No trade, no
occupation, no mode of earning one's living, could escape this allpervading power, and the acts of the legislature in limiting the hours of
36

Id.
For some, there is an inherent difficulty to understand that justices are capable or willing to craft their
arguments based on economic consequences. Particularly, justices are perceived as lacking the expertise in
economics. Even for justices versed in law and economics, “macroeconomic performance, that is output,
production, unemployment, and inflation, are ‘mysterious macroeconomic phenomena.’” RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003).
38
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52.
39
People v. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. 396 (App. Div. 1902), aff’d, 69 N.E. 373 (N.Y. 1904), rev’d, Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
40
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63–65.
41
Id. at 52–65.
42
Id. at 56.
37
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labor in all employments would be valid, although such limitation might
seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support himself and his
family.43
¶28

The Lochner Court’s choice to infuse the Constitution with a laissez-faire view of
economics was, of course, neither new nor novel. As the legal and political science
scholar Bernard Schwartz has written, judicial opinions at the time of Lochner often
advanced specific economic theories.44 Indeed, Justice Peckham himself had previously
issued opinions as a judge on the New York Court of Appeals critiquing the “paternalist”
approach to government and favoring a regulation-free environment.45 In People ex rel.
Annan v. Walsh, for example, he argued that during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the dominant view of economics held that the government “was to watch over
and protect the individual at every moment, to dictate the quality of his food and the
character of his clothes, his hours of labor, the amount of his wages, his attendance upon
church, and generally to care for him in his private life.”46 Fortunately, Peckham argued,
economic theory had evolved by the early twentieth century, and the value of individual
freedom and liberty were better understood as central to both an individual’s and the
nation’s success. For example, in Walsh he argued the law should not “interfere with
what seems to me the most sacred rights of property and the individual liberty of
contract.”47 Doing so can only “ruin or very greatly impair the value of the property of
wholly innocent persons.”48 Moreover, Peckham commented that “[I] firmly believe, the
more correct, ideas . . . and a truer conception of the proper functions of government” call
for a respect of the natural “law of supply and demand.”49
¶29
More than a few scholars and commentators have criticized Justice Peckham (along
with the “four horsemen” who held similar viewpoints later in time)50 as simply a selfinterested decision-maker seeking to promote a theory of economics that would advance
and empower the capitalist class to the disadvantage of the workers.51 This political point
may or may not be true, but what is undeniable is that many economists and
policymakers did—and still do—share Peckham’s view, believing economic freedom and
43

Id. at 59.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 192–93.
45
Id. at 199.
46
22 N.E. 682, 686 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting), aff’d, Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892).
47
Walsh, 22 N.E. at 695 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 687, 695. The case was appealed and Justice Brewer adopted a similar view to that taken by then
Judge Peckham:
The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The utmost possible liberty to the
individual, and the fullest possible protection to him and his property, is both the limitation and
duty of government. If it may regulate the price of one service which is not a public service, or
the compensation for the use of one kind of property, which is not devoted to a public use, why
may it not with equal reason regulate the price of all service, and the compensation to be paid for
the use of all property? And, if so, “Looking Backward” is nearer than a dream.
Budd, 143 U.S. at 550 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
50
Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler were often labeled the “four horsemen”
because they continually voted as a block to strike down any and all commercial legislation.
51
See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559 (1997) (noting the
criticisms, but arguing that the views of the conservative Justices were far more nuanced, complicated, and
probably supportive of economic policies than generally understood).
44
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liberty were—and are—crucial for a successful and prosperous nation.52 Perhaps the
experts espousing this view were fundamentally self-interested, but it is difficult to
believe that all constitutional theorists with anti-government views were, or are,
shamefully self-focused, while those with pro-government views are fundamentally
beneficent and other-regarding. We take the view that all the Justices writing in the
Lochner-era, irrespective of their underlying views on economic regulation, shared an
interest in national economic success (along with their own individual prosperity), but
disagreed as to the best means for achieving this goal.
¶30
The Lochner case generated two dissents. Justice Harlan, writing for himself and
Justices White and Day, quoted extensive labor data and statistics supporting the idea that
government regulation was essential for a healthy and viable workforce.53 With respect
to bakers specifically, Justice Harlan noted that the profession, while seemingly
innocuous, was in fact riddled with danger:
The constant inhaling of flour dust causes inflammation of the lungs and
of the bronchial tubes. The eyes also suffer . . . [and] bakers are subjected
[to] rheumatism, cramps, and swollen legs . . . . During periods of
epidemic diseases the bakers are generally the first to succumb.54
The unregulated baking market, in Justice Harlan’s view, could lead to an ailing and
diseased workforce, thereby undermining both individual well-being and the well-being
of the entire labor force—an important component of the nation’s economic success.55
Harlan, however, did not go so far as to suggest that government regulation was always
necessary. Quoting the well-known political economist William Stanley Jevons, he
noted, “[t]he manner, occasion, and degree in which the state may interfere with the
industrial freedom of its citizens is one of the most debatable and difficult questions of
social science.”56 Harlan went on to note, however, “I do not stop to consider whether
any particular view of this economic question presents the sounder theory . . . . [Where]
there is room for debate and for an honest difference of opinion,” the Court should
uphold the regulation, especially given the reality that legislators were in the best position
to protect their constituents.57
¶31
The most well-known dissent in Lochner, of course, belongs to Justice Holmes and
addresses neither the importance of freedom of contract nor the value of government
regulation to the success of the market. Instead, Justice Holmes picks up on the last part
of Justice Harlan’s dissent, taking the position that the Court should defer to the experts
in the legislative and executive branches of government and avoid infusing the
Constitution with any of the Justices’ own pet theories of economics however plausible

52

See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985) (advancing a political and economic theory of the state that seriously questioned government
regulations and privileges liberty and property in a manner similar to that of the Lochner Court).
53
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 70–72 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54
Id. at 70–71 (citing language from an anonymous writer).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 72 (internal quotations omitted).
57
Id.
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or implausible they might be.58 Given the importance of Holmes’ view to the subsequent
development of the law, it is worthwhile to quote it at length:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that
theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my
mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe
that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law . . . . The Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics . . . . Some of these
laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share.
Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to
conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying
them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.59
Justice Holmes’ view, as indicated in the introduction to this Article, eventually became
the majority view of the Court, which was a relief to many of his contemporaries, as well
as to subsequently appointed Justices. As Justice Frankfurter noted nearly forty years
after the Court decided Lochner, “Had not Mr. Justice Holmes' awareness of the
impermanence of legislation as against the permanence of the Constitution gradually
prevailed, there might indeed have been ‘hardly any limit but the sky’ to the embodiment
of ‘our economic or moral beliefs’ in [the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’]
‘prohibitions.’”60
¶32
Before Justice Holmes’ view became the official view of the Court in the late
1930s, the intra-Court dispute over economic regulations waged on with each side
continuing to advance its own theory as the best means to assure the nation’s long-term
prosperity. The Supreme Court reporters are filled with cases and controversies that
illustrate the divergent viewpoints held by the Justices on the Court. We will offer just a
few examples to make our point, which must by now be obvious: the Court was
58

Id. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 75–76.
60
AFL v. American Sash & Door, 335 U.S. 538, 543 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Baldwin
v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930)). Speaking of Lochner and other cases adhering to a laissez faire
theory of economics, Justice Frankfurter noted:
[T]hese were reflected in juridical assumptions that survived the facts on which they were based.
Adam Smith was treated as though his generalizations had been imparted to him on Sinai and
not as a thinker who addressed himself to the elimination of restrictions which had become
fetters upon initiative and enterprise in his day. Basic human rights expressed by the
constitutional conception of “liberty” were equated with theories of laissez faire. The result was
that economic views of confined validity were treated by lawyers and judges as though the
Framers had enshrined them in the Constitution. This misapplication of the notions of the
classic economists and resulting disregard of the perduring reach of the Constitution led to Mr.
Justice Holmes' famous protest in the Lochner case against measuring the Fourteenth
Amendment by Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
Id.
59
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concerned with economic issues, and each one of the Justices sought to advance national
economic prosperity, albeit with conflicting approaches and theories. For purposes of
discussion, we will focus on the cases that have received substantial attention in the
literature given their important doctrinal holdings, but not necessarily for the dicta and
commentary contained in the opinions with respect to the economy. We focus on the
rhetoric in order to highlight the underlying policy concerns that motivated the
constitutional doctrines of the time.
¶33
Consider first Hammer v. Dagenhart,61 a 1918 case involving the Keating-Owen
Act, which banned transportation in interstate commerce of goods made at a factory in
which children under the age of fourteen years were employed or permitted to work.62
Congress apparently enacted the law not only to support the progressive idea that child
labor was morally problematic, but also in response to the difficulty of adopting child
labor laws at the state level. Apparently, states hoping to bar the production of childmade goods were deterred from doing so given the competitive disadvantage they would
face compared to competitor states lacking age-specific labor laws.63
¶34
Roland Dagenhart, who worked with his two sons in a cotton mill in Charlotte,
North Carolina, challenged the Keating-Owen Act as unconstitutional.64 Justice Day,
writing for the majority, agreed with the petitioner, holding that Congress had invaded
the powers reserved for the states in the Tenth Amendment.65 The majority argued that
the legislation would not only interfere with states’ rights and commerce generally, but
would destroy the government as we know it:
The far reaching result of upholding the act cannot be more plainly
indicated than by pointing out that if Congress can thus regulate matters
entrusted to local authority by prohibition of the movement of
commodities in interstate commerce, all freedom of commerce will be at
an end, and the power of the states over local matters may be eliminated,
and thus our system of government be practically destroyed.66
¶35

Justice Holmes, dissenting with Justices McKenna, Brandeis, and Clarke, argued
that the Court’s outcome in Dagenhart was inconsistent with earlier decisions that had
sanctioned similar federal laws, and, more importantly, the Keating-Own Act was clearly
within the federal government’s power to regulate interstate commerce.67 Holmes further
noted that the national government was uniquely able to adopt such regulation because it
would not suffer the same consequences that would plague the states, namely corporate
refusals to do business in a jurisdiction with child labor laws.68 Holmes pointed out that
“public policy of the United States is shaped with a view to the benefit of the nation as a
whole.”69 The national government needs to be involved because it may understand
61

247 U.S. 251, 268–69 (1918).
Act of Sept. 1, 1916, 39 Stat. 675.
63
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 268–69.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 269.
66
Id. at 276.
67
Id. at 278–81 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 281.
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national needs better than “some self-seeking [s]tate” that is likely to embrace any
regulation that is desirable to its interests of keeping business within its jurisdiction and
away from competitor states, but nonetheless disadvantageous to the nation as a whole.70
¶36
The majority in Dagenhart argued that federal regulation would undermine
commerce, while the minority took the position that regulation was necessary to ensure
that nationwide benefits were obtained. This divide surfaced in case after case that
showed up on the Court’s docket. Consider Coppage v. Kansas, which implicated a
Kansas statute prohibiting employers from conditioning employment on an employee’s
agreement to forgo membership in a labor organization.71 The case involved the St.
Louis & San Francisco Railway Company and T.B. Coppage, who discharged an
employee after the employee refused to resign from a labor organization.72 Coppage was
found guilty in the lower courts of violating state law,73 and Justice Pitney, for the
majority, subsequently struck down the law on the grounds that it interfered with the
freedom to contract—a freedom essential to the success of all individuals and
businesses.74 More specifically, as stated by the majority:
[This] right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as
to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to
begin to acquire property, save by working for money . . . . Indeed, a little
reflection will show that . . . the contract is made to the very end that each
may gain something that he needs or desires more urgently than that which
he proposes to give in exchange.75
¶37

Like Lochner and Dagenhart, the Coppage case also generated dissenting opinions.
Still questioning the Court’s ability to usefully opine on substantive economics, Justice
Holmes argued that the Court should overrule Lochner and defer to the experts—the
elected branches of government.76 Justice Day, writing for himself and Justice Hughes,
argued that individuals should not be forced to choose between employment and the
exercise of free choice given that the two are so fundamentally related to the “welfare of
society.”77 Moreover, Day argued along with Holmes that it is not for the Court to
interfere with the judgment of the Legislature on such important matters, especially
considering “the existence of the conditions with which [the legislature] was dealing.”
Opinions may differ as to the remedy, but we cannot understand upon
what ground it can be said that a subject so intimately related to the
welfare of society is removed from the legislative power . . . . It would be
difficult to select any subject more intimately related to good order and the

70

Id.
236 U.S. 1, 6 (1915) (referring to KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4674 & 4675 (1909)).
72
Id. at 6–8.
73
Id. at 7.
74
Id. at 26.
75
Id. at 14, 17.
76
Id. at 27 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77
Id. at 38 (Day, J., dissenting).
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security of the community than that under consideration—whether one
takes the view that labor organizations are advantageous or the reverse.78
¶38

One last case should suffice to make the point that the Court was motivated by the
desire to advance the nation’s commercial and financial interests, along with individual
freedom and autonomy, through the decision-making process. Or, put differently,
constitutional doctrine was important in part because the Justices viewed it as a means to
an end—economic prosperity. In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, the Court considered a
law providing women and children with a minimum wage in the District of Columbia.79
The Court struck down the “price-fixing” regime, again taking the position that the
regulation interfered with individual liberty and freedom of contract (i.e., government
interference barred individuals from negotiating and bargaining for the best possible
arrangement given their individual needs).80 Not only did the Court worry about freedom
to contract, it discussed extensively the ways in which the law would interfere with the
supply and demand of labor, essentially guaranteeing certain laborers (i.e., women) a
fixed wage whether or not they were capable of earning it and irrespective of the ability
of the business to sustain the burden.81 This scenario, the Court suggested, was neither
fair nor economically sustainable over the long run.82
¶39
The Court was presented with expert reports and opinions claiming that wage laws
enabled women to succeed in the workplace and to live in substantially better conditions
than ever before.83 Revealing a sophisticated understanding of econometrics, the
majority responded to this empirical claim by noting that the country had been doing
economically well with high levels of employment and, thus,
[n]o real test of the economic value of the law can be had during periods
of maximum employment, when general causes keep wages up to or above
the minimum; that will come in periods of depression and struggle for
employment, when the efficient will be employed at the minimum rate,
while the less capable may not be employed at all.84

In short, the Court was not convinced that it was the laws that aided women and
suggested that the regulations could actually be costly to their interests in the long run if,
in the face of an economic downturn, they were the first to lose their jobs given the high
(and possibly unwarranted) pay scale mandated by the Legislature.85
¶40
In their dissenting opinions, both Justice Taft and Justice Holmes agreed that the
causal link between women’s economic success and the law were disputable. Justice
Holmes argued, “When so many intelligent persons, who have studied the matter more
than any of us can, have thought that the means are effective and are worth the price it

78

Id. at 38–39.
261 U.S. 525, 539 (1923) (referring to the Act of September 19, 1918, ch. 174, 40 Stat. 960).
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Id. at 539–40.
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Id. at 545–46, 554.
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Id. at 557–58.
83
Id. at 560.
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seems to me impossible to deny that the belief reasonably may be held by reasonable
men.”86 And in Justice Taft’s words,
I agree that it is a disputable question in the field of political economy how
far a statutory requirement of maximum hours or minimum wages may be
a useful remedy for these evils, and whether it may not make the case of
the oppressed employee worse than it was before. But it is not the function
of this court to hold congressional acts invalid simply because they are
passed to carry out economic views which the court believes to be unwise
or unsound.87
¶41

The Lochner era, which continued through the 1920s,88 is widely associated with
the anti-regulatory views espoused in cases such as Dagenhart, Coppage, and Adkins, but
it is important to note that the Court did not uniformly strike down commercial regulation
in this period. Indeed, fifteen years prior to Adkins, the Court upheld state legislation
fixing a minimum wage for women in Muller v. Oregon.89 Moreover, in the 1917 case
Bunting v. Oregon, the Court upheld overtime wage laws,90 which prompted some to
argue the case was a sub silencio overruling of Lochner.91 And, in the 1919 Arizona
Employers’ Liability Cases, the Court considered a law imposing liability upon
employers, without regard to fault, for compensatory damages in accidents resulting in
injury or death not caused by the employees’ own negligence.92 The Court upheld that
law, noting that employers could adopt a wage rate accounting for this new liability and,
thus, avoiding interference with the freedom to contract.93 In the Court’s words,
The employer, if required—as he is by this statute in some occupations—
to assume the pecuniary loss arising from such injury to the employee,
may take this into consideration in fixing the rate of wages; besides which
he has an opportunity, which the employee has not, to charge the loss as a
part of the cost of the product of the industry.94
Justice Holmes further argued, with the majority, that by adopting strict liability, the
legislature would impose a cost on the employer, but that the employer would, in turn,

86

Id. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 562 (Taft, J., dissenting).
88
See David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: the New Deal: 1931–1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
504, 504 (1987).
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208 U.S. 412 (1908). There, Brandeis was counsel for the State of Oregon. Brief of Appellee at 24,
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107).
90
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). Note that in this case, Justice-to-be-Frankfurter submitted an
article concerning the constitutional and economic implications of labor laws: Felix Frankfurter, Hours of
Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1916).
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Bunting, 243 U.S. 426, 433–34 (referring to the relevant sections of the statute).
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250 U.S. 400, 417 (1919) (referring to the Employers' Liability Law Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 3153–
3162 (1913)).
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Id. at 439–40.
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Id. at 422.
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pass it along to the consumers, thereby imposing increased costs on the public-at-large.95
This economic reality was both sensible and justifiable in Holmes’ view:
It is reasonable that the public should pay the whole cost of producing
what it wants, and a part of that cost is the pain and mutilation incident to
production. By throwing that loss upon the employer in the first instance,
we throw it upon the public in the long run, and that is just. If a legislature
should reason in this way and act accordingly, it seems to me that it is
within Constitutional bounds.96
¶42

Justice McKenna, however, strongly dissented, arguing that the majority had
adopted a “specious” view of the world: “In justification of its discrimination between
employer and employee, that the employer may, in relief from it and rescue from its
burdens, pass them to the consumers of his products,” is seriously problematic.97 He
argued,
There is attractive speciousness in the argument. The individual employer
seems to be devested of grievance and the problem the law presents to be
one of economics and governmental policy; is a kind of taxation, an
expense of government, the burden of which is properly laid upon the
public and over which a court can have but limited power . . . What burden
can be put upon industry or the activities of men that may not be justified
by it?98

¶43

Thus, while the Lochner era is identified with the laissez-faire approach to
constitutional interpretation, the time period was also peppered with judicial decisions
supporting government regulation. Our point is not whether a specific doctrinal or
economic view succeeded or failed in the Court between 1900–1930, but rather that the
Justices—irrespective of their views—continued to issue opinions that contained
substantial rhetoric and dicta addressing the importance of market transactions, economic
conditions, and the law’s role in fostering economic prosperity to the greatest extent
possible.
¶44
Of course, the questions that naturally arise are: (1) What caused the Court to veer
from its anti-regulatory views during the early decades of the twentieth century?; and (2)
Why did the Lochner view prevail in some but not all the cases that reached the Court?
The facts and applicable law, along with the changing make-up of the Court, may help to
explain the changes in the observed outcomes. But Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt offer an
alternative explanation: As the economy cycled through periods of growth and
contraction, the Court responded with pro- and anti-government outcomes as posited by
the theory outlined above.99 The authors have investigated this hypothesis and have
found that the Court became substantially more pro-government when the economy was
95
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flourishing, and more oppositional to the government’s interests when the economy
began to falter.100 The votes and outcomes of every case, of course, do not fit this
decision-making trend, but Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt have found convincing evidence
that the Court appears, on average, to cycle with the economy. A judicial business cycle,
in short, seems to exist.
¶45
We now turn to an investigation of the cases and controversies decided during the
1930s, a decade that experienced three distinct economic periods. As indicated in Figure
1, above, the country dropped into a depression between the years 1929–1934, which was
then followed by a two-year period of economic growth, which itself was followed by a
second depression beginning in 1937. These changing economic conditions, as we will
see, appear to be correlated with the dramatic doctrinal changes that were simultaneously
taking place on the Court. In our view, this correlation is not unexpected or surprising.
Rather, we argue that it was the changing economic conditions that partially caused the
Court to alter its course. To be sure, the Court did not immediately respond to the
economic conditions that emerged—a time lag seemed to exist—but overall the level of
correlation is surprisingly high.
III. THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
¶46

By late 1929, the nation had fallen into a serious economic decline and the Justices,
like businesses and employees generally, understood this reality. Indeed, while the
judicial opinions in the prior three decades identified economic prosperity as a general
goal, by the early 1930s the Court began to address the proper role of the legislators in
aiding the nation given the specific circumstances that had emerged. As in earlier
decades, the Justices seemed to agree on the nation’s underlying economic goal—
recovery—but the means by which it should be achieved continued to divide the Court.
¶47
Before examining the Court’s rhetoric and dicta addressing economic theory during
the Great Depression, consider first Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, a 1932 case involving shipping rates set by the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) for the transportation of grain and grain products.101 The chosen rates applied to
post-1930 transactions but were grounded on data collected prior to the economic
downturn, and, for this reason, the shippers sought to have the ICC reconsider its
decision.102 The petitioners did not challenge the ICC’s authority, and Justice Hughes,
writing for a unanimous Court, did not address that issue. Instead, he simply took
judicial notice of the prevailing economic conditions, thereby illustrating the Court’s
attention to these realities in the decision-making process:
There can be no question as to the change in conditions upon which the
new hearing was asked. Of that change we may take judicial notice. It is
the outstanding contemporary fact, dominating thought and action
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throughout the country . . . “a depression such as the country is now
passing through is a new experience to the present generation.”103
In other words, the extraordinary and powerful macroeconomic factors, the Court held,
justified a new hearing for the shippers with respect to the shipping rates they could
legally charge.
¶48
That the Court took judicial notice of the massive economic downturn did not lead
to a unified view on how to address it, or to a consensus on how the Court should respond
to state and federal policymaking choices. In the 1932 case New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, for example, the Court considered a state statute that forbid the manufacture,
sale, or distribution of ice without a license on the theory that the nation’s problems were
caused, in part, by heightened levels of competition.104 The majority, however, refused to
sanction legislation deterring business activity, indicating support for a laissez-faire
approach to policymaking in the economic arena. Writing for the majority, Justice
Sutherland noted:
The [legal] control here asserted does not protect against monopoly, but
tends to foster it. The aim is not to encourage competition, but to prevent
it; not to regulate the business, but to preclude persons from engaging in it.
There is no difference in principle between this case and the attempt of the
dairyman under state authority to prevent another from keeping cows and
selling milk on the ground that there are enough dairymen in the business;
or to prevent a shoemaker from making or selling shoes because
shoemakers already in that occupation can make and sell all the shoes that
are needed.105
¶49

Justice Brandeis dissented, arguing that the economic conditions justified the very
limits that the majority found problematic.106 Indeed, he went so far as to note that “[t]he
people of the United States are now confronted with an emergency more serious than
war. Misery is wide-spread in a time not of scarcity, but of over-abundance.”107 The
circumstances, in short, called for dramatic and new regulatory instruments that, while
challenging the accepted wisdom of a free and competitive market, were nonetheless
necessary to preserve the nation’s interests. In Justice Brandeis’ words,
The long-continued depression has brought unprecedented unemployment,
a catastrophic fall in commodity prices and a volume of economic losses
which threatens our financial institutions. Some people believe that the
existing conditions threaten even the stability of the capitalistic system.
Economists are searching for the causes of this disorder, and are
reexamining the bases of our industrial structure. Business men are
seeking possible remedies. Most of them realize that failure to distribute
103
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widely the profits of industry has been a prime cause of our present plight.
But rightly or wrongly, many persons think that one of the major
contributing causes has been unbridled competition. Increasingly, doubt is
expressed whether it is economically wise, or morally right, that men
should be permitted to add to the producing facilities of an industry which
is already suffering from over-capacity.108
¶50

As noted above, the economic downturns experienced during the typical business
cycle are expected to cause the Court to issue anti-government opinions on the theory that
the elected branches have pursued flawed policies and programs. Justice Brandeis,
however, was convinced that the nation was not in a typical economic contraction, but
had found itself in a crisis that required a different strategy altogether—judicial
collaboration with Congress and the President. As it turns out, Brandeis’ views with
respect to the crisis and the need for a pro-government strategy gained traction shortly
after the Court issued its decision in New State Ice Co.; the Court began issuing antigovernment decisions, thereby undermining the strategies pursed by the elected branches.
A. The Turn Away from Lochner: Judicial Support for Regulation in an Economic Crisis

¶51

As the depression continued to wage, the Court began to shift its views in favor of
government intervention; the Court, in short, began to side with policymakers in their
attempt to turn the economy around, rather than punish them for the problematic
conditions plaguing the nation. The language in Home Building & Loan Assoc. v.
Blaisdell, decided in 1934, vividly depicts the Court’s understanding of the devastating
economic conditions, along with its view that policymakers were in a position to offset
some of the misery, and, most importantly, that the Court should not block these
legislative efforts.109 Blaisdell involved the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law,
which sought to aid homeowners in a number of ways, including through the
postponement of pending bank foreclosures, given the emergency at hand.110 The Court
upheld the statute noting that “[w]hile the emergency does not create power, emergency
may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.”111 Analogizing to other types of
emergencies the nation has faced and the need for a government response in those
situations, Justice Hughes discussed the prevailing economic conditions at length.112
Note in the passage below that his rhetoric makes the claim that the extant state of the
economy is similar to an “Act of God” and, thus, was not caused by the ineptitude or
incompetence of government decision-making. It is exactly in these circumstances that
the theory posits the Court will seek to support and not undermine the nation’s financial
managers.
The present nation wide and world wide business and financial crisis has
the same results as if it were caused by flood, earthquake, or disturbance
in nature. It has deprived millions of persons in this nation of their
108
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employment and means of earning a living for themselves and their
families; it has destroyed the value of and the income from all property on
which thousands of people depended for a living; it actually has resulted in
the loss of their homes by a number of our people and threatens to result in
the loss of their homes by many other people, in this state; it has resulted
in such widespread want and suffering among our people that private,
state, and municipal agencies are unable to adequately relieve the want
and suffering, and congress has found it necessary to step in and attempt to
remedy the situation by federal aid. Millions of the people's money were
and are yet tied up in closed banks and in business enterprises.113
¶52

The distressed economy, in the majority’s view, necessitated the legislation. The
decision, however, was not unanimous. Justice Sutherland, writing for himself and
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler—the “four horsemen”—argued that the
Minnesota legislation unconstitutionally impaired the right to contract.114 They took
judicial notice of the economic conditions of the time, but argued that the “present
exigency is nothing new. From the beginning of our existence as a nation, periods of
depression, of industrial failure, of financial distress, of unpaid and unpayable
indebtedness, have alternated with years of plenty.”115 This rhetoric, like Justice
Hughes’, quoted above, is illustrative of the overall point of the theory—it indicates that
the dissenters viewed the economic climate as no different from any other downturn. It
was, in short, a typical downturn and thus most likely related to the inept decisionmaking of the elected branches of government. In these typical circumstances, the more
rational approach would be for the Court to weaken—not bolster—the legislative choices
being challenged in court.
¶53
Soon after the Court decided Blaisdell, it rendered a decision in Nebbia v. New
York, again ruling in favor of government pricing rules found in New York’s Milk
Control Laws.116 Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts considered the purpose behind
the law and determined that “existing economic conditions” called for regulation, as such
conditions “have largely destroyed the purchasing power of milk producers for industrial
products, have broken down the orderly production and marketing of milk, and have
seriously impaired the agricultural assets supporting the credit structure of the state and
its local governmental subdivisions.”117 The Court also noted that the legislature had
studied the problem, thereby suggesting the elected officials were not only in a better
position to address the serious issues at hand, but that the problems were not the typical
evils faced by the nation:
The legislative investigation of 1932 was persuasive of the fact that . . .
unrestricted competition aggravated existing evils, and the normal law of
supply and demand was insufficient to correct maladjustments detrimental
to the community. The inquiry disclosed destructive and demoralizing
113
114
115
116
117
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competitive conditions and unfair trade practices which resulted in retail
price-cutting and reduced the income of the farmer below the cost of
production.118
¶54

Dissenting from the majority opinion, Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter,
Sutherland, and Butler also assessed the macroeconomic effects of the regulation and
noted that the argument for regulation was simply not convincing. Neither the Court nor
the legislature, they argued, sought to indicate just how “higher charges at stores to
impoverished customers when the output is excessive and sale prices by producers are
unrestrained, can possibly increase receipts at the farm.”119 Moreover, they noted that to
allow the legislature to regulate in these circumstances would eventually lead to greater
disorder and chaos:
If here we have an emergency sufficient to empower the Legislature to fix
sales prices, then whenever there is too much or too little of an essential
thing—whether of milk or grain or pork or coal or shoes or clothes—
constitutional provisions may be declared inoperative, and the “anarchy
and despotism” . . . are at the door.120

¶55

Blaisdell and Nebbia, both decided in 1934, indicated the Court’s increasing
support for government regulation. Our point is not to identify doctrinal changes,
although they are both intriguing and important, but to note that depressionary conditions
had come to pervade the judicial mind and that, irrespective of one’s view on the specific
legislation challenged in Court, many of the Justices sought to use their interpretive
powers in a manner that advanced the nation’s interest in economic recovery. They
sought not to undermine the financial strategies of the elected branches, at least for a
short period of time. It should be pointed out that by 1934, the nation’s economic
conditions had just begun to improve,121 but judicial recognition of that improvement was
not likely to coincide with the change in the economy—a time lag would exist given
information delays and, thus, it is possible that 1934 was likely to be viewed as a crisis
year for the majority of the Court. Importantly, our point here is to shed light on
variables heretofore left unexplored which nonetheless are likely to have affected judicial
votes and outcomes. If, how, and when these factors affected the Justices will be subject
to further investigation in later work.
B. Back to Lochner: Judicial Opposition to Regulation in a Period of Economic
Recovery

¶56

Many Court-watchers believed Lochner was put to rest in 1934.122 Soon the Court
disabused the nation of this idea by issuing a series of decisions in 1935 and 1936 striking
down substantial portions of the New Deal legislation, thereby suggesting that laissez118
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faire had not only returned, but had returned with a vengeance. For purposes of
understanding the cases, the rhetoric, and the outcomes, keep in mind that the economy
had begun to climb out of the depression and had prospered for more than a year by the
time the Court issued the decisions discussed below.123 The conditions that warranted
New Deal legislation, in short, had arguably abated by the time the cases and
controversies had reached the High Court; as noted above, a short-term economic
recovery emerged between March 1933 and May 1937.
¶57
Consider first Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,124 a 1935 case in which the Court held
that the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA), which delegated to the
President the authority to prohibit the transportation of petroleum oil,125 “burden[ed]
interstate and foreign commerce, affect[ed] public welfare, and undermine[d] the
standards of living of the American people.”126 The problem, according to the Court, was
that the legislation provided no guidelines to the President in his regulation of the
industry, nor did it require him to investigate the conditions that made prohibition of oil
transportation necessary for economic recovery.127 Congress, in short, had unlawfully
delegated power to the President.128 Notably, those Justices who typically advocated that
government regulation was an answer to economic recovery, sided with the majority in
Panama Refining. Specifically, Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts agreed that an
unconstitutional delegation of power had occurred.129
¶58
However, Justice Cardozo, the sole dissenter, seemed to believe the crisis had not
abated and argued:
[It was] [b]eyond question prevailing conditions in the oil industry have
brought about the need for temporary restriction in order to promote in the
long run the fullest productive capacity of business in all its many
branches, for the effect of present practices is to diminish that capacity by
demoralizing prices and thus increasing unemployment.130
¶59

After the Court issued its decision in Panama Refining, it went on to issue antiregulation opinions in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,131 United States v.
Butler,132 Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,133 and various other cases, all of which struck down
regulation intended to help the nation recover from the Great Depression. The problem,
as noted above, is that the government adopted the policies and programs when the nation
was unambiguously facing a major economic crisis, but by the time the controversy
123

See supra Figure 1.
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
125
Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (repealed 1935). As background, the later-declaredunconstitutional National Industrial Recovery Act commanded mandatory self-regulation of virtually all of
American business as a means to regulate free markets across a wide range of products. Steven A.
Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 535 (2003).
126
Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 416–17.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 436–37 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
131
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
132
297 U.S. 1 (1935).
133
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
124

112

Vol. 5:1]

¶60

¶61

¶62

¶63

Nancy Staudt & Yilei He

reached the Court, the state of the economy had notably improved, suggesting a dramatic
legislative response was unnecessary and possibly counterproductive to the nation’s
interests.
Like Panama Refining, Schechter Poultry involved provisions of the NIRA
intended to promote economic recovery via anti-competitive measures, this time in the
context of the poultry industry, and included provisions addressing the number of hours
for a workday, the number of employees, the volume of sales, and so forth.134 Finding
that the legislators had again unconstitutionally delegated power to the President, and that
the legislation had exceeded Congress’ commerce powers, the Court unanimously struck
down the law.135 In his opinion, Justice Hughes noted that “extraordinary conditions may
call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to
justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority.”136
In 1934, the Court implied that economic crises necessitated legislation, but in
Panama Refining and Schechter, the Court clearly established limits to what the elected
branches could constitutionally do in pursuit of their goals.137 Moreover, while they did
not note the economic growth and prosperity that had begun to take place in these two
cases, the reality was the nation had begun to recover, and in subsequent opinions the
Court took on-the-record judicial notice of this fact.138
United States v. Butler139 involved the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,
which levied a tax on agricultural products in order to defray the increasing costs of
public expenditures during the economic emergency.140 The majority struck down the
levy noting that a “tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used in the
Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the government. The word has
never been thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit
of the other.”141 Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo dissented, arguing that “a
constitution, may mean what it says: that the power to tax and spend includes the power
to relieve a nationwide economic maladjustment by conditional gifts of money.”142
Finally, our last illustration of the return to the Lochner-era involves Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.,143 a case challenging the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935,
which contained various provisions intended to stabilize the coal mining industry and
promote its interstate commerce.144 The majority noted that Congress adopted the law to
protect the general public interest, an object of “great worth,” but went on to hold that
Congress had no authority to act as it did.145 In Justice Sutherland’s words, the economic
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evils that Congress sought to address were all local issues and, thus, only the States were
constitutionally empowered to address them.146 As the Court said,
[A]ll local evils over which the federal government has no legislative
control. The relation of employer and employee is a local relation. At
common law, it is one of the domestic relations. The wages are paid for
the doing of local work. Working conditions are obviously local
conditions. The employees are not engaged in or about commerce, but
exclusively in producing a commodity. And the controversies and evils
which it is the object of the act to regulate and minimize are local
controversies and evils affecting local work undertaken to accomplish that
local result. Such effect as they may have upon commerce, however
extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect. An increase in the
greatness of the effect adds to its importance. It does not alter its
character.147
¶64

On the other hand, Justice Cardozo, in his dissenting opinion with Justices Brandeis
and Stone, had a different perspective:
Overproduction was at a point where free competition had been degraded
into anarchy. Prices had been cut so low that profit had become impossible
for all except the lucky handful. Wages came down along with prices and
with profits. There were strikes, at times nation-wide in extent, at other
times spreading over broad areas and many mines. . . . The liberty
protected by the Fifth Amendment does not include the right to persist in
this anarchic riot. “When industry is grievously hurt, when producing
concerns fail, when unemployment mounts and communities dependent
upon profitable production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go
dry.”148

¶65

The Court’s opinions in Panama Refining, Schechter Poultry, Butler, Carter
Coal, and various other cases, generated more than a little outrage in the elected branches
of government. Believing that the Court was standing in the way of the nation’s
economic recovery (and not noting that it had already begun), President Roosevelt
devised his notorious Court-packing plan to increase the size of the Court, thereby
allowing additional appointments and effectively assuring judicial support for his New
Deal legislation.149 The Court’s anti-regulation position, along with the strong response
by the President, seemed to indicate that the nation had descended into a constitutional
crisis; this crisis, however, soon faded when the Court officially buried Lochner. Again,
146
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keep in mind that at the very time that the Court returned to its pro-government position,
the depression had reappeared, which is in line with the theory outlined above that the
Court would rationally respond to an economic crisis with a collaborate stance vis-à-vis
the elected branches of government.
C. Lochner is Dead: Buried with the Return of the Economic Crisis
¶66

In 1937, the Court issued a series of decisions supporting economic legislation and,
as noted in the introduction to this Article, in 1938 the Court declared it would henceforth
presume all commercial legislation would pass constitutional muster. The intra-Court
debate with respect to the best means to promote economic prosperity—through a laissezfaire or pro-regulation approach—shifted to a decision-making strategy that called for
complete deference to the policymakers.150 The Court had finally and officially adopted
the view of Justice Holmes’ dissenting opinion in Lochner: “[A] constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”151 For our purposes, it is important
to note that, given the return of the depressionary conditions after just a short recovery,
this judicial deference to the legislature was both justified and rational.
¶67
One of the first and most important decisions issued by the Court in 1937, during
its so-called “switch in time,” was West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.152 In this case, the
Court upheld a state law mandating a minimum wage for women, taking judicial notice
of the “unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the recent period of
depression and still continue to an alarming extent despite the degree of economic
recovery that has been achieved.”153 In sanctioning the law, the Court overruled Adkins,
which had been decided two decades earlier in the laissez-faire era of decision-making.154
Similarly, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steep Corp., the Court upheld legislation barring
employers from interfering with employees’ involvement in labor organizations, taking
judicial notice of the fact that self-organization “is often an essential condition of
industrial peace, and that refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific
causes of strife.”155 The Court addressed the earlier case Coppage, which struck down
similar legislation, by simply stating it was not relevant to the case.156
¶68
Also in 1937, in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,157 the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Social Security Act of 1935, which imposed an employment tax
on states in order to facilitate an unemployment trust fund to subsidize those who had lost
their jobs.158 Undermining the recently decided Carter Coal case, the Court upheld the
legislation, noting the benefits of setting up a federal unemployment fund by the statute,
as “[federal government's] possession of the moneys and . . . control of investments will
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be an assurance of stability and safety in times of stress and strain.”159 Indeed, the Court
even suggested that federal action would not create constraints, but rather “a larger
freedom” as “a cooperative endeavor to avert a common evil”—namely,
unemployment.160 Apparently, the need to address unemployment was the primary
purpose for the Court to uphold the statute:
During the years 1929 to 1936, when the country was passing through a
cyclical depression, the number of the unemployed mounted to
unprecedented heights. Often the average was more than 10 million; at
times a peak was attained of 16 million or more. . . . There was need of
help from the nation if the people were not to starve. It is too late today
for the argument to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the
use of the moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and their
dependents is a use for any purpose narrower than the promotion of the
general welfare.161
¶69

The Court continued to sanction state and federal legislation and to overturn earlier
decisions that struck regulations as unconstitutional.162 The judicial decisions, in effect,
adhered to the standard of review set out in Carolene Products indicating that the Court
would presume the constitutionality of all economic legislation.163
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

¶70

In this Article, we first discussed Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s theory of judicial
decision-making that posits a “judicial business cycle”: a theory of the Supreme Court
that argues the Justices will account for macroeconomic trends in the context of
economic cases and controversies. While Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt investigated the
theory with a large-N empirical study, in this Article we focused on the rhetoric and dicta
in Court opinions to determine whether the Court judicially noticed economic conditions
and used this information to inform its decision-making calculus. While the analyses
presented above cannot prove that the judicial business cycle exists, it does offer
substantial support for the theory, thereby evidencing its plausibility. Specifically, we
found that many of the Depression-era cases can be understood as judicial attempts to
foster economic growth and prosperity and should not be viewed merely as illustrations
159

Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 596. Noting the importance of the law for addressing unemployment
issues, litigants argued:
[T]he adoption of unemployment compensation systems . . . would mitigate the severity of
depressions and the drain on the federal treasury in two ways: first, they would prevent that
exhaustion of the resources of workers, charities and local governments which now occurs in
ordinary periods of occasional unemployment long before any cyclical depression, and second,
such systems would prevent the onset, or lessen the destructive effect of, cyclical depressions by
making available to meet the emergency a stored-up fund of consumer purchasing power.
Brief of Respondents at 24, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (No. 837) (internal
citations omitted).
160
Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 587.
161
Id. at 586–87.
162
See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding child labor laws and striking down
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)).
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See discussion supra note 2.
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of judicial flip-flopping due to political pressures or inexorable legal developments as
conventionally argued in the extant literature.
¶71
The cases and controversies that reached the Court in the first three decades of the
twentieth century were particularly useful for purposes of understanding the judicial
mind. In this period, the Court continually set forth a variety of economic viewpoints and
explicitly accounted for the national economic conditions, suggesting these factors were
important components to the decision-making process. While this type of rhetoric and
dicta largely disappeared from the Court’s opinions with the 1938 decision in Carolene
Products, we believe the Court continues to worry about economic issues, and sub
silencio uses its statutory interpretation powers to achieve exactly the same aims and
goals pursed in all the eras discussed in this Article. This belief is supported by the
preliminary empirical findings set forth in prior work on the judicial business cycle,164
but warrants quite a bit more qualitative and quantitative investigation.

164

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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